McGinn, Colin - The Subjective View: Secondary Qualities and Indexical Thoughts

There are various ways in which the mind represents the world. It is legitimate to enquire, of any way in which the world is mentally represented, whether that way is subjective or objective in nature: that is, to enquire whether the world is so represented because of the specific constitution of the representing mind or because the world as it is independently of the mind contains a feature which demands representation. Which aspects of our view of reality have their source in our subjective make-up and which reflect reality as it is in itself? This question lies at the intersection of metaphysics and the philosophy of mind; to answer it would be to learn something both about how the mind is (or must be) and about how the world is objectively constituted. Once we have a demarcation of subjective and objective ways of representing the world, we can ask the further question of what is distinctive of each and precisely how they are related. Are there any general principles governing subjective and objective modes of representation? Is one more basic than the other? Is either eliminable in some way? Does one possess greater verisimilitude than the other?