Cook, John W. - Wittgenstein, Empiricism, and Language

In his lectures during the 1930s Wittgenstein often commented on the difference between what he was doing and what previous philosophers had done. Yet despite these differences there were also connections, he said. Too often, I believe, the differences have been emphasized and the connections ignored, with the result that his work has been seriously misunderstood. I want, if possible, to rectify this situation.

Price, H.H. - Hume's Theory of the External World

Hume's discussion of Causality and Induction is familiar to all students of Philosophy, some of whom seem almost to think that he never wrote about anything else. His theory of Personal Identity has also attracted a good deal of attention from subsequent philosophers and psychologists. But his theory of Perception and of the External World has been very little discussed, and seems to have had little or no influence upon his successors. Yet it is one of the most brilliant and most original parts of the Treatise of Human Nature, and the problems with which it is concerned have not lost their interest, or their importance.

Quine, W.V. & Carnap, R. (Creath, R., ed.) - Dear Carnap, Dear Van: The Quine-Carnap Correspondence and Related Work

The Volume that follows contains the complete correspondence over more than thirty-five years between Rudolf Carnap (1891–1970) and W. V. O. Quine (1908–). It also contains three very early (1934) lectures by Quine on Carnap as well as a short paper by Carnap and Quine's memorial tribute to Carnap of 1970. All but the last of these are hitherto unpublished. Together they provide a remarkable record of a major philosophic controversy and of an enduring friendship.

Borg, Emma - Minimal Semantics

In this book I want to consider the question of what a semantic theory (that is, a theory of literal linguistic meaning) is for—if I were to give you a good, working theory of meaning for a language right now, what would you be able to do with it? Prima facie, there are some minimal things anything deserving the title of 'theory of meaning' must be able to do—say, tell you the meaning of primitive lexical items, and explain how to move from the specification of the bits of a sentence and their relationship to one another (the sentence's logical or syntactic form) to a specification of the meaning of that sentence (its semantic assignment). Equally obviously, there are a vast range of things for which having a semantic theory won't be much direct help—things like seeing, or digesting, or walking to Timbuktu. But in between these two extremes a vast penumbra opens up, containing issues which we may or may not expect a semantic theory to address, and it is this penumbra which forms the territory for this book.

Child, William - Causality, Interpretation, and the Mind

This book is an essay on two themes in the philosophy of mind, and on the relations between them. One theme is the idea that we can give an account of belief, desire, and the other propositional attitudes by giving an account of the ascription of attitudes to a subject on the basis of what she says and does. The other theme is the idea that the concepts of ordinary, common-sense psychology—the concepts of action, perception, memory, and so on—are essentially causal.

Craig, Edward - The mind of God and the works of man

This book has grown out of a series of three radio talks first broadcast in January 1981; without much distortion it can be thought of simply as an expansion of them. An edited version of the talks was published in Philosophy in April 1983, and a quick run through that article still provides a good introduction.

Woolhouse, R. S. & Francks, R. (transl. & ed.) - Leibniz’s ‘New System’ and Associated Contemporary Texts

Until 1710, with the publication of his book-length Essais de théodicée, the ideas of the German philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646- 1716) were publicly available only through his articles in learned journals such as the Latin-language Acta eruditorum (Leipzig, from 1682) and the French-language Journal des savants (Paris, from 1666),¹ Nouvelles de la République des lettres (Amsterdam, from 1684), Histoire des ouvrages des savants (Rotterdam, from 1687), and Mémoires pour l'histoire des sciences et des beaux arts (Trévoux, from 1701).² These did not always have a large European-wide audience: Barber points out that 'Leibniz seems to have assumed that an article in the Acta alone [which he himself helped found] was inadequate as a means of reaching the French public; his first article in the Nouvelles de la République des lettres is a translation of one in the Acta'.³

Putnam, Hilary - The many faces of realism

When I wrote Reason, Truth and History, I described my purpose as breaking the stranglehold which a number of dichotomies have on our thinking, chief among them the dichotomy between 'objective' and 'subjective' views of truth and reason. I described my view thus (p. xi): "I shall advance a view in which the mind does not simply 'copy' a world which admits description by One True Theory. But my view is not a view in which the mind makes up the world (or makes it up subject to constraints imposed by 'methodological canons' and mind-independent 'sensedata'). If one must use metaphorical language, then let the metaphor be this: the mind and the world jointly make up the mind and the world."

Jolley, Nicholas - The Light of the Soul: Theories of Ideas in Leibniz, Malebranche, and Descartes

There is a story about seventeenth-century philosophy which goes roughly as follows. Descartes broke with the scholastic tradition by advancing an austere new mechanistic theory of the physical world; according to this theory, bodies intrinsically possess only geometrical properties. Descartes thus stripped the world of many properties which were formerly classified as unambiguously physical. Some of the properties which were left over from the new scientific picture of the world could be safely discarded; the powers, natures, and faculties beloved of the scholastics are obvious examples. But there were many other properties, such as secondary qualities, which could not be treated in this cavalier fashion; they had to be located somewhere, and Descartes invented a new concept of mind in order to accommodate them.

Fodor, Jerry A. - Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong

My topic is what concepts are. Since I'm interested in that question primarily as it arises in the context of 'representational' theories of mind (RTMs), a natural way to get started would be for me to tell you about RTMs and about how they raise the question what concepts are. I could then set out my answer, and you could tell me, by return, what you think is wrong with it. The ensuing discussion would be abstract and theory laden, no doubt; but, with any luck, philosophically innocent.

That is, in fact, pretty much the course that I propose to follow. But, for better or for worse, in the present climate of philosophical opinion it's perhaps not possible just to plunge in and do so.

Lowe, E. J. - The Possibility of Metaphysics: Substance, Identity, and Time

In the Preface, I explained that the overall objective of this book is to help to restore metaphysics to a central position in philosophy as the most fundamental form of rational inquiry, with its own distinctive methods and criteria of validation. But if such a project is not to be stifled even before its inception, we need to have some assurance that its aim is a coherent and legitimate one.

Plantinga, Alvin - Warrant: The Current Debate

My topic is warrant: that, whatever precisely it is, which together with truth makes the difference between knowledge and mere true belief. More specifically, my topic is contemporary views of warrant.

Plantinga, Alvin - The Nature of Necessity

The distinction between necessary and contingent truth is as easy to recognize as it is difficult to explain to the sceptic's satisfaction.

Adams, Robert Merrihew - Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist

The last twenty years or so have seen a flowering of Leibniz studies. The organizers of a recent international workshop called it "the Leibniz renaissance."¹ In the United States interest in the philosophy of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) was enhanced in the 1970s by the excitement over modal logic and "modal metaphysics." The idea of a possible world was central to these developments, and that gave them an obvious connection with Leibniz. I think there was also a subtler and deeper, though perhaps more debatable, connection between Leibniz and the new work in modal metaphysics.

Quine, Willard Van Orman - Word and Object

This familiar desk manifests its presence by resisting my pressures and by deflecting light to my eyes. Physical things generally, however remote, become known to us only through the effects which they help to induce at our sensory surfaces. Yet our common-sense talk of physical things goes forward without benefit of explanations in more intimately sensory terms. Entification begins at arm's length; the points of condensation in the primordial conceptual scheme are things glimpsed, not glimpses. In this there is little cause for wonder. Each of us learns his language from other people, through the observable mouthing of words under conspicuously intersubjective circumstances. Linguistically, and hence conceptually, the things in sharpest focus are the things that are public enough to be talked of publicly, common and conspicuous enough to be talked of often, and near enough to sense to be quickly identified and learned by name; it is to these that words apply first and foremost.

Dowe, Phil & Noordhof, Paul (eds.) - Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic World

The world most probably is indeterministic, meaning that there are particular events which lack a sufficient cause. Once we grant that there are such events, and that at least some of them are caused, we then require an account of causation that gives the conditions in which they are to count as caused. This is the problem of indeterministic causality. Providing for indeterministic causality has been a major motivation for the development of probabilistic accounts of causation.

Shapiro, Stewart (ed.) - The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic

From the beginning, Western philosophy has had a fascination with mathematics. The entrance to Plato's Academy is said to have been marked with the words "Let no one ignorant of geometry enter here." Some major historical mathematicians, such as René Descartes, Gottfried Leibniz, and Blaise Pascal, were also major philosophers. In more recent times, there are Bernard Bolzano, Alfred North Whitehead, David Hilbert, Gottlob Frege, Alonzo Church, Kurt Gödel, and Alfred Tarski. Until very recently, just about every philosopher was aware of the state of mathematics and took it seriously for philosophical attention.

Künne, Wolfgang - Conceptions of Truth

There are at least two ways of asking the question, 'What is truth?' One of them is commonly attributed to Pilate: is there ever any hope that we might disclose the truth if the problem is a really delicate one? As is well known, 'jesting Pilate. . . would not stay for an answer'.¹ Another way of putting that question is the way Socrates asked, 'What is courage, what is piety, what is knowledge?' Many great philosophers took the question 'What is truth?' in a Socratic spirit, and the answers given through the ages are what the title of this book alludes to as 'conceptions of truth'.

Kitcher, Philip - Science, Truth, and Democracy

What is the role of the sciences in a democratic society? Some people, let us call them the "scientific faithful," say this: "The sciences represent the apogee of human achievement. Since the seventeenth century, they have disclosed important truths about the natural world, and those truths have replaced old prejudices and superstitions. They have enlightened us, creating conditions under which people can lead more satisfying lives, becoming more fully rational and more fully human. The proper role of the sciences today is to continue this process, by engaging in free inquiry and by resisting attempts to hobble investigations for the sake of any moral, political, or religious agenda."

Kitcher, Philip - The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge

In this book I shall provide a theory about mathematical knowledge. I take as my starting point the obvious and uncontroversial thesis that most people know some mathematics and some people know a large amount of mathematics. My goal is to understand how the mathematical knowledge of the ordinary person and of the expert mathematician is obtained.

Kitcher, Philip - The Advancement of Science: Science Without Legend, Objectivity Without Illusions

Once, in those dear dead days, almost, but not quite beyond recall, there was a view of science that commanded widespread popular and academic assent. That view deserves a name. I shall call it “Legend.”

Nagel, Thomas - The Last Word

This discussion will be concerned with an issue that runs through practically every area of inquiry and that has even invaded the general culture—the issue of where understanding and justification come to an end. Do they come to an end with objective principles whose validity is independent of our point of view, or do they come to an end within our point of view—individual or shared—so that ultimately, even the apparently most objective and universal principles derive their validity or authority from the perspective and practice of those who follow them? My aim is to clarify and explore this question and to try, for certain domains of thought, to defend what I shall call a rationalist answer against what I shall call a subjectivist one. The issue, in a nutshell, is whether the first person, singular or plural, is hiding at the bottom of everything we say or think.

Read, Rupert & Richman, Kenneth A. (eds.) - The New Hume Debate

Does Hume believe that there are causes in the world that have the power to bring about their effects? Does he believe that these causes are objects in the world? Does he believe that there are any objects in the world at all? What does Hume think about the fact that some people (but not all of us) feel compelled to ask questions about causes and objects? These questions have been discussed for some time, but over the last few years, with the introduction of new readings of Hume as a sceptical realist about causal powers and external objects, the discussion has moved to new levels of sophistication, subtlety and care in the interpretation of Hume’s texts and their historical context.

Sorensen, Roy A. - Thought Experiments

This book presents a general theory of thought experiments: what they are; how they work; their virtues and vices. Since my aim is synoptic, a wide corpus of thought experiments has been incorporated. There is a special abundance of examples from ethics and the metaphysics of personal identity because thought experiments in these areas have recently attracted heavy commentary. But the emphasis is on variety, rather than quantity. Thus, the discussion ranges over thought experiments from many disparate fields, from aesthetics to zoology.

Pols, Edward - Mind regained

The study of mind was once an ample and commodious study, drawing into it not only our scientific interests but our moral and religious ones as well. It was long dominated by the conviction that mind itself is the deepest ordering principle of nature or at least the most important expression of that ordering principle. Although I call it the study of mind, it was also the study of the soul and--because soul was often regarded as the life principle--the study of life as well. Sometimes the mind was regarded as the highest factor in the hierarchical structure of the souls of particular human beings. Sometimes a distinction was made between a divine, infinite, and universal Mind and a human, finite, and particular mind; in that case the divine Mind was regarded as the maker of the human soul and thus of the finite mind resident in that soul.

Berger, Karol - A Theory of Art

What is art? One is tempted to paraphrase St. Augustine's answer to another inquiry: "What is time then? If nobody asks me, I know: but if I were desirous to explain it to one that should ask me, plainly I know not."¹ Having said this, Augustine went on to look for an answer anyway, and so should we. But first I should clarify the question, make it more precise, show that it is worth asking, and think what a satisfactory answer would have to look like.

Mackie, John L. - The Miracle of Theism: Arguments for and against the existence of God

The topic of this book is theism, the doctrine that there is a god, and in particular a god as conceived in the central tradition of the main monotheistic religions, including Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. It is my view that the question whether there is or is not a god can and should be discussed rationally and reasonably, and that such discussion can be rewarding, in that it can yield definite results.

Higginbotham, James, Pianesi, Fabio & Varzi, Achille C. (eds.) - Speaking of Events

We speak of actions and other events with the same easiness with which we speak of people and other objects. We say of John that he is bright and of Bill's lecture that it is boring. We say of John's father that he is taller than Bill's and of John's life that it is better than Bill's. We say of Clark Kent that he is Superman and of Clark Kent's death that it is the death of Superman. The pervasiveness of this talk does not by itself imply that there are such things as events—that events are to be included in an inventory of the world over and above people and material objects. But one can hardly question that some theory of events is needed if one is to make sense of such talk at all. Moreover, we often speak in such a way as to suggest—implicitly—that we are talking about events.

Heil, John & Mele, Alfred (eds.) - Mental Causation

In 1970 I proposed a theory about the relation between the mental and the physical that I called Anomalous Monism (AM).¹ AM holds that mental entities (particular time- and space-bound objects and events) are physical entities, but that mental concepts are not reducible by definition or natural law to physical concepts. The position is, in a general way, familiar: it endorses ontological reduction, but eschews conceptual reduction. What was new was the argument, which purported to derive AM from three premisses, namely, (1) that mental events are causally related to physical events, (2) that singular causal relations are backed by strict laws, and (3) that there are no strict psycho-physical laws.² The first premiss seemed to me obvious, the second true though contested (I did not present arguments for it), and the third true and worth arguing for. Many readers have found my arguments against the existence of strict psycho-physical laws obscure; others have decided the three premisses are mutually inconsistent. But the complaints have most often been summed up by saying that AM makes the mental causally inert. The criticisms are connected: if AM makes the mental causally inert, then AM apparently implies the falsity of the first premiss and hence the inconsistency of the three premisses. The third premiss seems to many critics the relevant offender, so they urge that it should be dropped.

Read, Stephen - Thinking About Logic: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic

This book is an introduction to the philosophy of logic. We often see an area of philosophy marked out as the philosophy of logic and language; and there are indeed close connections between logical themes and themes in the analysis of language. But they are also quite distinct. In the philosophy of language the focus is on meaning and reference, on what are known as the semantic connections between language and the world.

In contrast, the central topic of the philosophy of logic is inference, that is, logical consequence, or what follows correctly from what.